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Abstract
This article begins by critically assessing some of the current measures used to evaluate the status
and impact of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). It then lays the groundwork for a deeper examina-
tion of RtoP’s strength by specifying what kind of norm it is, and what it can reasonably be expected
to do. The third section engages Zimmerman and Deitelhoff’s framework on norm robustness and
contestation by positing two arguments. First, the past decade of diplomatic engagement and policy
development has brought about greater consensus on RtoP’s core elements, and thus enhanced its
validity; however, this process has also dampened many of RtoP’s original cosmopolitan aspirations.
Second, persistent applicatory contestation about RtoP’s so-called third pillar is revealing deeper con-
cerns about the norm’s justification – thereby leading some actors to avoid framing situations with
RtoP terminology. I use two cases to address the broader theoretical questions raised about whether
and how language matters in assessing norm robustness: the international community’s response to
the deepening political violence in Burundi in 2015, and the evolution of the international community’s
response to the war in Syria (2011–17). While these cases illustrate changing perceptions of the politi-
cal utility of RtoP language, concrete engagement by the international community, particularly in the
Burundi case, indicates that RtoP’s validity remains intact. The article concludes that norm decay is
not equivalent to norm death, and that RtoP’s prescriptions will survive given that they are embedded
in a broader normative structure of human rights, humanitarian law, and civilian protection.
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Introduction
At the 2005World Summit that marked the 60th anniver-
sary of the United Nations, more than 170 heads of state
and government unanimously accepted three interlinked
responsibilities, which together constitute the principle
of the responsibility to protect (RtoP). The first, set out
in paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome Document
(United Nations General Assembly 2005), is the primary
responsibility of states to protect their own populations
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing, and the responsibility to prevent the oc-
currence of these acts. The second, in paragraph 139, is
the pledge by states to assist each other in fulfilling their
protection responsibilities. And finally, as members of a
broader international community, states declared their
readiness to take collective action, in a timely and de-
cisive manner, if any state were “manifestly failing” to
protect its population from atrocity crimes.1 These three
provisions are now commonly summarized in academic
1 In this article I use the term “atrocity crimes” ex-
clusively to refer to the four acts specified in para-
graph 138. Genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity are defined in international criminal law; eth-
nic cleansing, while not established as a distinct crime,
includes acts that will regularly amount to one of the
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and diplomatic discourse as the “three pillars” of RtoP
(Ban Ki-Moon 2009).
The responsibilities articulated in the Summit Out-
come Document were designed by their proponents to
push states beyond a restatement of the status quo and
above the lowest common denominator of state prefer-
ences. With concrete failures of collective action in the
backdrop (such as the genocides in Rwanda and Sre-
brenica), diplomats sought to close the gap between the
existing legal responsibilities of states, already articulated
in international humanitarian and human rights law, and
the reality of populations threatened with large scale and
systematic violence. The particular frame of the “respon-
sibility to protect”was explicitly crafted by a set of norm
entrepreneurs as an alternative to the older concept and
practice of humanitarian intervention, as it was believed
it would more effectively address the problem of inac-
tion (or selective action) in the face of mass killing (Evans
2008; Bellamy 2011; Thakur 2016a). The notion of pro-
tection shifted the focus from the claims or rights of in-
tervening states, to the victims of suffering in need of
assistance (ICISS 2001: 15). Moreover, the moral idea
of responsibility enlarged the circle of protective actors
available to prevent or respond to atrocity crimes. In the
context of RtoP, responsibility was to be understood as
arising not from a particular agent’s voluntary action – in
other words, causal responsibility – but rather from the
very fact of vulnerability. Responsibility in the context of
RtoP is thus “about exposure to an event that does not
come from us and yet calls to us” (Raffoul 2010: 23).
This context reveals three important features of what
I will refer to as the ‘complex norm’ of the responsibility
to protect. The first is that RtoP was deliberately institu-
tionalized at the 2005World Summit as a political, rather
than legal principle. General Assembly resolutions (like
the one which affirmed the content of the Summit Out-
come Document) do not themselves constitute sources of
international law, though they can be taken as author-
itative interpretations of existing legal regimes (Strauss
2009; Welsh and Banda 2010). But more importantly, the
preparatory diplomacy surrounding the World Summit
clearly shows that it was not the intention of states to cre-
ate additional legal obligations. Former United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan, one of the key promoters
of RtoP, insisted that his goal was not to develop new
law, but rather to both strengthen states’ existing legal
commitments to protect their populations and improve
implementation of key aspects of international human
rights and humanitarian law, including the extraterrito-
aforementioned crimes, in particular genocide and
crimes against humanity.
rial responsibilities set out in the Genocide Convention
(Jones 2005). His understanding of RtoP as a political
commitment resonated with a variety of states, which,
for very different reasons, opposed the crystallization of
the principle into a new legal responsibility to prevent
and respond to atrocity crimes (Welsh 2013).
The second key feature to underscore is the direc-
tive, as opposed to prohibitive or permissive, nature of
this norm (Sandholtz 2016). While RtoP was conceived
partly to bolster prohibitive provisions in international
law (for example, the law prohibiting genocide), it is
framed directively, as at-risk populations requiring pro-
tection. Nonetheless, as I will argue later, RtoP is unlike
many other directive norms in that it does not specify a
single or particular behavior from states or other interna-
tional actors. Instead, as an articulation of a prospective
responsibility, RtoP ‘directs’ these actors to bring about
a certain state of affairs: protection for vulnerable popu-
lations.
The third notable feature of RtoP is its aspirational
character. Research on norm life cycles has previously
noted that pivotal events or so-called critical junctures
constitute one common source of new norms (Florini
1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Flockhart 2005). As
suggested above, the catalytic events that sparked the ac-
tivity of RtoP’s norm entrepreneurs produced a broad
call for change. Yet, the advocates of RtoP also acknowl-
edged that the aspirational principles that have the great-
est impact in international society are those that do not
stray too far from what members of international so-
ciety already believe is legitimate. Thus, with another
pivotal event in their minds - the contested case of the
1999 Kosovo War, which did not have the express au-
thorization of the United Nations Security Council - the
diplomats and political leaders present at the 2005World
Summit negotiated a version of the responsibility to pro-
tect that they believed would honor the letter and spirit
of the UN Charter and serve as an ally, rather than adver-
sary, of sovereignty (Luck 2010; Bellamy 2011; Thakur
2016a).
This article begins by critically analyzing some of the
current measures used to assess RtoP’s status and im-
pact, and showing how they fall short in helping us to
understand its robustness as a norm. The second section
lays the groundwork for a deeper examination of RtoP’s
strength by specifying more clearly what kind of norm
it is, and what it can reasonably be expected to do. The
third section then engages directly with Zimmerman and
Deitelhoff’s framework on robustness and contestation
by positing two overall arguments. First, the past decade
and a half of diplomatic engagement and policy devel-
opment has brought about greater consensus on RtoP’s
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core elements, and thus enhanced its validity. However,
this process has also dampened many of RtoP’s origi-
nal cosmopolitan aspirations. Second, persistent appli-
catory contestation about RtoP’s so-called third pillar is
revealing deeper concerns about the norm’s justification
– thereby leading some actors to seek to avoid framing
situations in RtoP terminology. Two cases in particular
suggest that actors’ perceptions of the utility of RtoP lan-
guage may be waning, thereby raising broader theoretical
questions about whether and how language matters in as-
sessing norm robustness: the international community’s
response to the deepening political violence in Burundi in
2015, and the evolution of the international community’s
response to the war in Syria (2011–17). While some ad-
vocates of RtoP suggest that language is less significant
than what states and other actors actually do in prac-
tice, the norm’s status as a political principle make the
decreasing use of its specific language in particular sit-
uations a sign of potential decay. Nonetheless, the con-
crete engagement and action taken by the international
community, particularly in the case of Burundi, indicate
that RtoP’s validity remains intact: there is still a strong
normative belief that the risk or commission of atroc-
ity crimes activates an international responsibility to re-
spond. I also conclude that norm decay is not equiva-
lent to norm death, and that RtoP’s prescriptions will
survive given that they are embedded in a broader nor-
mative structure of human rights, humanitarian law, and
civilian protection.
Debating RtoP’s Strength
On one side of the ledger, it is patently clear that,
despite repeated calls to ‘never again’ allow the most
terrible forms of persecution and violence to occur,
atrocity crimes remain a feature of the 21st century
landscape. From Iraq, Syria and Yemen, to North
Korea and Myanmar, to South Sudan and the Cen-
tral African Republic, acts that may constitute geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity have occurred in many contexts of con-
flict, government repression or state breakdown dur-
ing the period since the 2005 World Summit. While
the majority of these acts have been perpetrated by
governments or by factions supported by governments,
the threats to populations have been heightened by the
emergence of violent extremists – such as the Islamic State
(ISIL), Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab - who brazenly
flout international humanitarian law and showcase their
crimes. Taken together, these situations have created pro-
tection challenges of a monumental scale, including the
highest number of displaced persons since the end of the
Second World War.
In more general terms, many Member States of the
United Nations have yet to become parties to the inter-
national conventions that set out the legal framework for
the prevention and punishment of atrocity crimes, includ-
ing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.2 And
even among those who have ratified these relevant legal
instruments, there is an alarming decline in respect for
international humanitarian and human rights law, par-
ticularly in situations where national authorities argue
that exceptional security threats or political crises jus-
tify abrogation from their legal obligations (Ban Ki-moon
2016a). The Syrian conflict, which at the time of writing
has claimed the lives of more than 400,000 people and
displaced over half of the country’s pre-war population,
is the most glaring example. The scale of the civilian harm
perpetrated in Syria cannot be explained solely as an un-
intended consequence of the fighting, but rather as the
result of both strategic and tactical choices made by war-
ring sides.
In contrast to this seemingly bleak picture, advocates
of the norm of RtoP stress its extraordinary progress at
a declarative level in a relatively short period of time
(Bellamy 2016; Thakur 2016b; Evans 2017). The com-
mitment to protection made by heads of state and gov-
ernment has been publicly reaffirmed many times since
2005. All of the key intergovernmental bodies of the
United Nations have discussed and affirmed RtoP in sev-
eral instances – both in principle and in relation to spe-
cific country situations. As of June 2018, the Security
Council had adopted more than 50 resolutions that refer
to the responsibility to protect, several of which have re-
minded national authorities of their responsibility to pro-
tect their populations3 and at least two of which have au-
thorized peacekeepingmissions that have explicitly called
for support to national authorities in upholding their
2 As of January 2018, 47 UN Member States have yet to
become party to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, 28 have yet to become party
to the two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, and 71 have yet to become party to the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.
3 See, for example, Security Council resolutions 2014
(2011), 2095 (2013), 2277 (2016), 2288 (2016), 2295 (2016),
2332 (2016), 2317 (2016), 2327 (2016), 2339 (2017), and 2348
(2017).
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responsibility to protect.4 TheGeneral Assembly has con-
tinued its consideration of the principle by convening
eight annual Informal Interactive Dialogues, referring to
the responsibility to protect in two Third Committee res-
olutions, and agreeing to put RtoP on the formal agenda
of both its 72nd and 73rd sessions (in 2017 and 2018).
For its part, the Human Rights Council has adoptedmore
than 25 resolutions that feature the responsibility to pro-
tect, including three on the prevention of genocide and
the majority relating to country-specific situations. In its
thematic resolution of 2016, it called upon all UN mem-
bers to work to prevent potential situations from result-
ing in atrocity crimes and, where relevant, to address
past instances of such crimes in order to avoid recurrence
(United Nations Human Rights Council 2016b).
The reply from more skeptical analysts of RtoP is
that discussions and resolutions mean very little, when
set against a pattern whereby warning signs or clear ev-
idence of atrocity crimes have been present, but where
strategic or other considerations have stood in the way
of collective action to protect (Reinold 2010). For them,
the fact that military intervention occurs in one situation
of humanitarian crisis, but not in another, is evidence
of the norm’s inherent weakness (Hehir 2013). More
broadly, the critical scholarly literature is split between
those who view the Summit Outcome Document’s provi-
sions on RtoP as too assertive - constituting a dangerous
challenge to state authority and to norms restricting the
use of force (Cunliffe 2010; O’Connell 2010) - and those
who see them as lacking ambition and falling short of the
structural and legal reforms required to prevent and re-
spond to atrocity crimes (Hehir 2012). Others claim that
the norm’s coercive dimension makes it highly suscepti-
ble to delegitimization, given the “structural problems”
that lie at the heart of any attempt to use military means
for humanitarian objectives (Paris 2014).5
The dichotomous nature of this debate is driven by
a lack of common ground both on methodology - i.e.,
whether language or practice is more significant to norm
robustness - and on how we should judge what Zimmer-
mann and Deitelhoff refer to elsewhere in this Special Is-
sue as “facticity”– i.e., the extent to which the content
of RtoP serves as guide for action. In order to build up a
common framework for assessing RtoP’s trajectory and
robustness, it is therefore critical to establish what kind
4 See Security Council resolution 1996 on South Sudan
(2011) and resolution 2085 on Mali (2012).
5 But see Thakur’s reply to Paris that these structural
problems apply to any international use of force in con-
temporary world affairs, and are not specific to RtoP
(Thakur 2015).
of norm it is, and what behavior we might reasonably
expect to follow from its prescriptions.
Unpacking RtoP as a Norm
It is useful to begin by re-emphasizing that RtoP arose
out of political considerations, rather than legal ones. The
text agreed to in 2005 does not, in itself, establish any
new legal obligations, but rather authoritatively inter-
prets states’ existing obligations to prevent and respond
to atrocity crimes and adds a political injunction for them
to implement what they have already agreed to. As a po-
litical principle, RtoP was designed to serve three func-
tions: to legitimize a shift in expectations about how the
international community should view situations involv-
ing atrocity crimes; to mobilize greater will to act and
raise the political costs of inaction; and to catalyze the de-
velopment of and investment in tools for prevention and
response (Welsh 2016a). I will return to assess progress
against these objectives in the next section.
Next, RtoP in its three-pillar form is a ‘complex
norm’, containing more than one prescription. States
have a responsibility to protect their own populations
from atrocity crimes, to assist others in upholding their
responsibilities, and to come together collectively to re-
spond when there are massive protection failures. This
complex structure suggests that the degree of RtoP’s fac-
ticity has to be judged at a variety of levels and in terms
of different kinds of conduct. It also creates a situation
in which the breach of one of the components of RtoP
(failure on the part of a national government to protect
its population) is meant to act as a trigger for fulfillment
of another component (the international community’s re-
medial role in protecting). This formulation makes the
norm particularly vulnerable to applicatory contestation,
given that states can debate whether certain pillars should
have greater emphasis - despite the Secretary-General’s
claim about the equal standing of all three pillars - and
when the international community’s remedial role has
been activated (i.e., when a national government can be
said to have “manifestly failed” to fulfill its protection
responsibilities). Seen from another perspective, however,
the complexity of RtoP has the potential to safeguard its
robustness, given that contestation is rarely directed at
all three dimensions and frequently seeks to strengthen
one aspect even while raising questions about another.
Hence, as I will demonstrate further below, even if states
raise concerns about the military dimension of RtoP, as
some have done in the context of the Informal Interactive
Dialogues of the General Assembly, they usually temper
their skepticism by emphasizing their support for the first
and second pillars of the norm.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the injunction
for collective action that is part of RtoP’s third pillar
makes this norm distinct from many of those that are
the focus of this Special Issue, or that have been ana-
lyzed within the broader International Relations litera-
ture. While norms such as the torture ban or the pursuit
of criminal accountability are assessed mainly by the de-
gree to which individual states internalize and implement
the norm’s injunctions, RtoP requires – for fulfillment of
its third pillar – the achievement of collective agreement
and collective response. Given that this is notoriously dif-
ficult to achieve in most aspects of international relations,
let alone in the context of responses to atrocity crimes,
how are we to judge levels of robustness? Collective ac-
tion norms of this kind call for a different form of assess-
ment, which focuses on the way in which actors portray
situations and deliberate on forms of response.
As a directive norm that calls for collective action,
what RtoP’s third pillar requires, at a minimum, is what
I have previously called a duty of conduct on the part
of members of the international community: to identify
when atrocity crimes are being committed or are immi-
nent, and to deliberate, through applicatory discourses,
on how different actors (national, regional and interna-
tional) can and should respond (Welsh 2013). But this
duty does not define, a priori, what specific response
should follow in every case of protection failure, partic-
ularly when it comes to the option of military interven-
tion. The appropriateness of different forms of action, as
specified in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome Doc-
ument, are deliberated on “a case by case basis”. Thus,
while RtoP directs (as described by Sandholtz elsewhere
in this Special Issue) it does not set out what particular
behavior is required to address a threat to a population.
In light of these features, defining RtoP’s strength in
terms of whether we see a consistent pattern of military
intervention is not an appropriate facticity test for the
norm.On the one hand, this standard is toomodest, given
that it overlooks the many other tools and mechanisms
that can be brought to bear to address situations fea-
turing atrocity crimes – mechanisms that were explicitly
identified in the Summit Outcome Document in 2005. So
while in 2011 military means were used in Libya with the
stated aim of protecting civilians threatened by the gov-
ernment, a year earlier, in Guinea, concerted efforts by
local, regional, and international actors – which included
preventive diplomacy, arms embargos, travels bans, and
threats of International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecu-
tions - helped to avert a recurrence of atrocity crimes fol-
lowing the massacre in the country in September 2009.
On the other hand, the standard of a consistent pattern
of intervention is too demanding, given that the coercive
dimension of RtoP is embedded within the existing col-
lective security system of the United Nations and thus de-
pends upon the particular structure and changing politi-
cal dynamics within the Security Council (the body with
the authority under the Charter to authorize collective
military action).
As Roberts and Zaum provocatively argued a decade
ago, the UN’s security system is both collective and un-
avoidably “selective” – a function of not only the veto
power of the permanent members but also the limited
capacity of UN Member States to deploy forces to en-
force Council mandates and the general reluctance of all
states to involve the Council in conflicts in which they
are parties or which they perceive as resistant to outside
involvement (Roberts and Zaum 2007). The casualties of
that selectivity have in some cases been all too apparent:
during the final phase of the war in Sri Lanka in 2009, in
which thousands of civilians lost their lives, the Council
did not even consider the conflict on its formal agenda –
a fact that was celebrated by some Sri Lankan officials as
a testament to their country’s skillful diplomacy (backed
by Russia and China) and ability to keep international
pressure at bay (Kurtz and Jaganathan 2016). In other in-
stances, most notably the ongoing war in Syria, stark dif-
ferences among major powers have blocked collective de-
cisions by the Council. By the beginning of 2018, Russia
had wielded its veto 11 times, thereby defeating Western-
sponsored resolutions related to different aspects of the
crisis.
It is crucial to emphasize, however, that a slow or
inadequate response from the Security Council is not
always a function of the interests, alliances, or polit-
ical motives of particular Security Council members,
no matter how powerful they may be in certain in-
stances. The lack of consensus on particular forms of
action within the Council can also be shaped by gen-
uine disagreement among its members about either the
appropriateness or the feasibility of using particular in-
struments (including military ones) for humanitarian
objectives (Welsh 2016a). In other words, even when the
application of RtoP is not in doubt, there can be in-
tense contestation concerning the means that the Coun-
cil should use to address a particular crisis, resulting in
deadlock. In the case of Darfur in 2004–5, for example,
Western states concluded that a successful military ef-
fort to counter the violence perpetrated by the Janjaweed
militia could not be mounted, given competing missions
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the difficulties associated with
the terrain in Sudan, and the risk that such an inter-
vention would have destabilizing effects for neighboring
countries. As demonstrated below, a similar kind of de-
bate raged within Western democratic states about the
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appropriateness, feasibility and consequences of using
military force against the Syrian government during the
summer of August 2013, following the gas attack that
killed civilians in the suburbs of Damascus.
These examples reveal that RtoP’s directive to re-
spond to atrocity crimes exists within a broader norma-
tive context in which ethical principles such as ‘reason-
able prospects of success’ and ‘do no harm’ often hold
considerable sway. Indeed, some of the norm’s support-
ers see the former notion, a key principle of Just War the-
ory, as integral to the overall framework of RtoP (Evans
2008). This partly explains, they would argue, why out-
comes will vary - and should be expected to vary - from
case to case. What is critical for an assessment of RtoP’s
robustness, then, is not whether military intervention oc-
curs in each and every instance of atrocity crimes, but
rather whether a response by the international commu-
nity is deemed necessary and genuine public deliberation
over different kinds of measures takes place.
Assessing Norm Robustness
With these parameters of strength in mind, I now turn
to assess RtoP’s validity and facticity, and the impact
of the contestation around the norm that has occurred
since the 2005 World Summit. The analysis above sug-
gests that only some of the indicators for norm robustness
that Zimmerman and Deitelhoff identify are applicable
to RtoP.While levels of norm acceptance and institution-
alization, as well as the nature of third party reactions to
violations, can be helpful in evaluating robustness, ratifi-
cation and compliance are more difficult to apply to RtoP,
given the political nature of the norm, its complex struc-
ture of prescriptions, and its reliance on collective action
for implementation of the third pillar. The sections below
also make two additional arguments regarding the rela-
tively strong degree of validity that RtoP enjoys on the
one hand, and its vulnerability to decay on the other.
Convergence on Validity
In general terms, the RtoP norm has experienced a rel-
atively high degree of validity (Deitelhoff and Zimmer-
man 2013). Its prescriptions, at both national and inter-
national levels, have encountered very little explicit or di-
rect contestation in the period since 2005. Informed by
the annual reports of the UN Secretary General,6 there
has been extensive consideration of the responsibility
to protect in the Informal Interactive Dialogues of the
6 See Ban Ki-moon 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015a, 2016b.
General Assembly and reaffirmation by Member States
of the commitments made at the World Summit. These
dialogues have helped to both advance a common un-
derstanding of the original concept of RtoP and build
support for an implementation framework based on the
three supporting pillars. Through the reports, the Secre-
tary General has also improved early warning and assess-
ment of atrocity crime risks within the UN system, and
clarified the role of regional and sub-regional arrange-
ments in fulfilling the responsibility to protect.
Statements by representatives of governments at the
annual dialogues have noticeably increased over the
years, with more and more states actively engaging with
the Secretary-General’s reports and requesting to take the
floor.7 In fact, the regularity and breadth of the discussion
on RtoP within the United Nations is relatively unique, in
comparison with other principles. More importantly, the
successive dialogues reveal that many states that origi-
nally expressed concern about what some described as
a “vague” and “illogical” concept, with “controversy
amongMembers States over [its] meaning” (Government
of Iran 2009; Government of China 2009; Government
of Malaysia 2009), have come to agree on many of its
core aspects, including the notion that the primary re-
sponsibility to protect lies with national authorities, and
that this responsibility entails prevention. There is also
broad consensus that international assistance efforts (for
example, through development cooperation or peace-
building programs) should be directed at enabling states
to address early signs of risk, that “timely and decisive
response” to the commission or imminent threat of atroc-
ity crimes should utilize a full range of diplomatic, politi-
cal, and humanitarian measures, and that the use of force
should be a measure of last resort.
A second sign of RtoP’s relatively high degree of
validity is that the growing convergence of views cov-
ers all regions (Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockmeier 2014;
Bellamy 2016). The empirical record of deliberation and
action makes it harder to argue today, compared with
the early years of the norm’s development, that RtoP is
a Western-only concept. As one multi-national study of
state practice concluded a decade after the World Sum-
mit: “[T]he core of the global political conflict over pro-
tection from atrocities has moved on. Most relevant ac-
tors around the globe accept the idea that the protection
of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and
7 As of July 2017, more than 120 Member States had
delivered statements at the Informal Interactive Dia-
logues. A summary of the dialogues, along with tran-
scripts of statements by Member States, is available at
http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/897.
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international responsibility.” (Global Public Policy Insti-
tute 2015) Many of the states that were once considered
at best skeptical about or at worst hostile to the princi-
ple of RtoP have themselves begun to reference and em-
ploy it, moving the debate forward from the merits of the
principle itself to how it should be implemented in par-
ticular cases. Thus, while there is a small set of states –
including Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Sudan – that
has consistently and vocally contested RtoP’s validity, a
much larger number of states have explicitly expressed
support for the principle as it has been articulated and
implemented within the UN. The record of the vote held
in September 2017 to place RtoP on the formal agenda
of the General Assembly speaks to the regional breadth
of this growing consensus.8
A closer examination of state discourse also serves
to illustrate this gradual convergence on validity. While
China’s intervention in the General Assembly discussion
of 2009 revealed concerns about RtoP’s scope and po-
tential to erode state sovereignty (Government of China
2009), by 2014 its diplomats were describing RtoP as a
“prudential norm”and suggesting that it was appropriate
for international society to adopt a variety of measures to
support its implementation, including the use of force “as
a last resort” (Government of China 2014). The discourse
of other non-Western states, such as Malaysia and India,
also reveals a shift in expectations about national and in-
ternational responsibilities to protect as well as more pos-
itive engagement with the norm. By 2015, Malaysia was
pointing to the “notable successes in the implementation
of responsibility to protect” (Government of Malaysia
2015). For its part, while India had initially observed
a “cautious go-ahead” on RtoP (Government of India
2009), its remarks a decade later contained construc-
tive suggestions on ways to link the principle’s imple-
mentation to broader agendas such as peacebuilding and
conflict prevention (Government of India 2015). Simi-
larly, Indonesia’s statement noted that UN bodies had
“come a long way in their efforts to strengthen adher-
ence to the three pillars of responsibility to protect”
8 113 states from every region (including countries such
as India, Afghanistan, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, and Morocco) voted
to include a supplementary item on the General Assem-
bly agenda entitled ‘The responsibility to protect and the
prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity’. There were 21 negative
votes and 17 abstentions. During the formal debate that
was held during the 72nd session, on 25 June and 2 July
2018, 79 country delegations and the European Union
spoke on behalf of 113 Member States.
and included ideas on how national governments could
strengthen implementation of their “pillar one” respon-
sibilities (Government of Indonesia 2015).
In addition, the statements of a number of African
countries indicate strong acceptance of RtoP’s validity.
For example, one of Africa’s most powerful states, Nige-
ria, has described RtoP as “representing a global con-
ceptual and policy shift in the notion of sovereignty and
security” (Government of Nigeria 2014). At the Gen-
eral Assembly dialogue in 2016, Tanzania noted that
RtoP now enjoyed “a large measure of political consen-
sus”, rooted in the “admission that the concept of State
sovereignty also implies a responsibility to protect one’s
citizenry.” Failure to meet this responsibility, it claimed,
“triggers a common or collective responsibility shared by
other States and other actors to intervene and protect”
(Government of Tanzania 2016). Even Egypt, which was
one of the core opponents to RtoP in the first General As-
sembly discussion in 2009 as spokesperson for the Non-
Aligned Movement, has changed the nature of its public
engagement. Rather than raising fundamental issues of
validity, its critique is focused on specific issues of im-
plementation. As its representative stated at the dialogue
marking the tenth anniversary of the World Summit Out-
come: “the debate on the concept of R2P should not be
regarded as one on themerit or the value of the concept it-
self, which we have all concurred to … but rather reflects
the suspicions harbored by some member-states regard-
ing its possible misuse.” (Government of Egypt 2015)
Finally, various episodes of applicatory contestation
over RtoP have in fact aided the development of this
intergovernmental consensus, thereby giving support to
theoretical claims about how norm contestation can ac-
tually have a strengthening effect, rather than serving
as a sign of norm weakness (Wiener 2008). As Badescu
and Weiss have shown, both the Russian claim about
RtoP’s applicability in its action in South Ossetia and
France’s argument about the norm’s relevance to the hu-
manitarian crisis in Burma after Cyclone Nargis were
strongly disputed by the wider society of states (Badescu
and Weiss 2010). However, these debates led to a con-
ceptual clarification of RtoP and greater consensus on its
scope. Henceforth, member states have articulated their
commitment to what the Secretary General’s first Spe-
cial Adviser, Edward Luck, described as the “narrow but
deep approach” to the norm (Welsh 2015), rooted in its
application to four particular international crimes but
open to implementation through amultifaceted toolkit of
measures. This process of applicatory clarification,which
specifies the nature and implications of the crimes that
RtoP is designed to prevent and address, adds weight
to Adam Bower’s argument that legal concepts and
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processes constitute an especially legitimate mode of jus-
tification (Bower 2016).
Nevertheless, two caveats to this positive assessment
of RtoP’s validity are in order. First, while UN Member
States all agree that the protection of populations from
atrocity crimes is both a national and international re-
sponsibility, and that prevention is at the core of this re-
sponsibility, their discourse reveals differences over both
the weight that should be placed on coercive measures
and the processes that should regulate any collective use
of military force. This contestation was most evident in
the immediate aftermath of the 2011 NATO-led inter-
vention in Libya (Morris 2013; Brockmeier, Stuenkel and
Tourinho 2016; Puri 2016),whenmany states raised con-
cerns about the alleged ‘stretching’ of the original Secu-
rity Council mandate to overthrow the Qaddafi regime,
and the subsequent support given to the Brazilian gov-
ernment’s “Responsibility While Protecting” proposal.9
But contestation over the appropriateness of the military
dimension of RtoP’s third pillar has continued to surface
in the annual dialogues, with individual states explicitly
referencing post-intervention chaos in Libya as a reason
for reassessing RtoP’s coercive dimension. Differences of
views on both the conditions for the use of force and its
management by the UN Security Council also constituted
one of the leading factors in the inability of the General
Assembly to adopt a substantive new resolution on RtoP
in late 2015.
The draft text of the resolution circulated in Novem-
ber 2015 – the first substantive resolution tabled since
the 2005 Summit Outcome - contained a number of
paragraphs reaffirming support for RtoP and elaborating
upon its first and second pillars. However, the proposal
from the drafting group10 confronted difficult negotia-
tions with respect to two operative paragraphs linked to
the third pillar that would have: 1) emphasized the need
9 On November 9, 2011, the Brazilian Permanent Repre-
sentative sent an official letter to the Secretary General
with a ‘concept note’ entitled “Responsibility while Pro-
tecting: elements for the development and promotion of
a concept.” (General Assembly 2011) The core propos-
als of the Brazilian initiative were twofold: first, that ef-
forts to implement RtoP should focus more intensively
on prevention; and second, that any authorization of the
use of force in the name of RtoPwould require clear ac-
countability mechanisms for those employing force in
the name of the Security Council.
10 The drafting group was co-led by Australia and South
Korea, and was based on a cross-regional represen-
tation of states that included, inter alia, Malaysia and
Brazil.
to implement RtoP “responsibly”; and 2) called for any
Security Council authorized use of force under the banner
of RtoP to contain both clear mandates and explicit pro-
cedures for reviewing progress. Both of these paragraphs
were perceived by NATO countries – particularly France
and the United States – as implicit criticism of the action
in Libya and as an attempt by the General Assembly to
place restrictions on the conduct of the Security Coun-
cil. By the spring of 2016, the negotiations had reached a
stalemate, with states unable to agree on a text. Although
the reaffirmation of RtoP enjoyed overwhelming support,
the inability of the General Assembly to elaborate on the
norm’s components, after ten years of discussion in in-
formal dialogues, was viewed by some as a sign that the
consensus was fraying, largely as a result of persistent
concerns about implementation of the third pillar.11
The formal debate on RtoP in the General Assembly
during the summer of 2018 reinforces this picture of con-
testation over the third pillar, as Member States clashed
over the issue of military intervention to halt atrocity
crimes. The Russian spokesperson represented the fur-
thest end of the spectrum, declaring that while RtoP had
“powerful humanitarian potential”, it had become asso-
ciated with “illegal military interference, regime change,
State destruction and economic disaster.” Iran also raised
concerns over the way RtoP had paved the way for
“interventionist policies”, while Pakistan claimed that
what was needed was a “surge in diplomacy, not war”.
The Government of India attempted a more constructive
path, by reaffirming its commitment to the norm andwel-
coming the broad consensus on the first and second pil-
lars, while at the same time acknowledging the need to
address the “legally complex and politically challenging
issues”which were connected to Pillar III. “The quest for
a more just global order”, declared its Ambassador Syed
Akbaruddin, “should not take place in a manner that will
undermine international order itself”.12
The second caveat is that the process of develop-
ing the consensus on RtoP’s validity has enhanced the
norm’s state centric elements, and downplayed its more
cosmopolitan aspirations. The context that gave rise to
the articulation of the responsibility to protect, at the
end of the 1990s, was marked by reflection upon the
lessons of the Rwandan genocide, and the alleged failure
11 Author’s confidential interviews with diplomats at Per-
manent Missions and non-governmental organisations
in New York, November 2015 and March 2016.
12 All formal statements during the debate on 25 June
and 2 July 2018 can be found at https://papersmart.
unmeetings.org/ga/72nd-session/plenary-meetings/
statements/. Accessed 10 July 2018.
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to intervene to save civilian populations from massacre.
One of the key entrepreneurs associated with RtoP’s de-
velopment - the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS) - further elaborated on
these lessons in its 2001 report, which sought to increase
international protection for individuals in situations of
severe human rights violations or humanitarian emer-
gency (ICISS 2001). Its work was embedded in a broader
paradigm of “human security”, advanced energetically
by diplomats such as former Canadian Minister of For-
eign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy.13 This paradigm placed the
individual, and his/her security, at the center of interna-
tional affairs – thereby seeming to challenge the tradi-
tionally dominant paradigm of state security. The human
security framework was linked to a related belief that
globalization, and deep forms of interdependence, had
made sovereign frontiers less relevant, and more porous
(Thakur 2005: 187). Although various ICISS Commis-
sioners denied strong claims that human security had
rendered sovereignty obsolete, the cosmopolitan roots of
RtoP did serve to make sovereign rights conditional on
the protection of populations.
The annual informal dialogues in the General Assem-
bly illustrate a subtle but important evolution from the
more individual or ‘people’ centred vision of the ICISS
report. Several states, and particularly those from the
developing world, have drawn on the specific text of
the Summit Outcome Document not only to emphasize
the preeminent role of national authorities in the imple-
mentation of RtoP, but also to call for international as-
sistance efforts that strengthen state capacity, reinforce
sovereignty, and respect different national ‘paths’ to im-
plementing RtoP. At the 2015 discussion in the General
Assembly, India underlined that international assistance
“should always be requested by the concerned state be-
fore it is offered” and that protection “policies must be
nationally owned rather than imposed from outside.”
(Government of India 2015) Similarly, Egypt’s statement
at the 2016 General Assembly dialogue suggested that
“the principal role of the international community” in
implementing RtoP was to “encourage and assist states”
(Government of Egypt 2016). In turn, Morocco’s rep-
resentative advised that Pillar II action should focus on
buttressing states’ own national mechanisms - thereby
creating “an environment conducive to protection of
their respective populations.” (Government of Morocco
13 ICISS was funded out of the broader Human Security
Programme, created by the Canadian government in
2000, which also included the development of the Pro-
tection of Civilians in Armed Conflict agenda of the UN
Security Council.
2016) But it is China, as Rosemary Foot has argued,
which has been the most strategic in efforts to employ
RtoP in ways that re-assert normative values such as state
sovereignty and ‘national ownership’. Its suggestion that
national governments should always decide upon the lev-
els and types of international assistance they require, she
writes, represents “a demand-led conception” of Pillar II
rather than one “stressing the role of international ac-
tors as capacity builders working to help a state pre-
vent atrocities.” (Foot 2019; see also Foot 2016). China’s
2015 statement during the Informal Interactive Dialogue
was particularly clear in arguing that the UN needed to
“follow the principle of national ownership and leader-
ship, respect the judicial traditions and national reality
of countries in distress and avoid producing negative im-
pact on the domestic situation in countries concerned”
(Government of China 2015).
Although these statements do not amount to a frontal
assault on RtoP, they arguably do represent a conscious
attempt to reshape the norm’s meaning through a form
of ‘constructive’ contestation. A number of UN mem-
bers, now led by China, are implicitly challenging more
cosmopolitan notions of conditional sovereignty and em-
ploying the three-pillar framework of RtoP to reassert the
importance of states, relative to the international commu-
nity, in the task of protection. This reflects a continuing
unease about the external enforcement of norms through
any form of international authority that stands above or
outside states themselves. As a result, the validity of RtoP
now depends upon adopting a more bottom-up approach
– where states fulfil their primary responsibility to protect
but also support one another, as peers, in protecting vul-
nerable populations (Welsh 2016b). This bottom-up per-
spective, which is also reflected in the Secretary-General’s
first report on RtoP (Ban Ki-Moon 2009), puts national
governments squarely at the centre of efforts to prevent
and respond to atrocity crimes – even if it also assigns a
key role to the international community.
Mixed Degrees of Facticity
In the period since the 2005 World Summit, many of
RtoP’s advocates – including key figures in the United
Nations (such as the Secretary-General and his Special
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect), Member States
who form part of the diplomatic ‘Group of Friends’ of
Responsibility to Protect, and civil society organizations
such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Pro-
tect – have sought to advance this bottom up approach.
They have largely avoided more general and controver-
sial normative debates – for example, about the meaning
and scope of sovereignty - and concentrated instead on
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embedding the idea of responsibility for atrocity crime
prevention and response into the work of a variety of ac-
tors and institutions. This focus on concrete institution-
alization has thus far largely succeeded in preventing the
contestation over RtoP’s third pillar from “radicalizing”
(Deitelhoff and Zimmerman 2013).
On one measure of facticity, then, RtoP has had no-
table success in guiding the development of specific pol-
icy and institutional capacity to prevent and respond to
atrocity crimes. And as those who have been actively en-
gaged in the norm’s implementation would argue, this
development should begin ‘at home’ (Bellamy and Luck
2018). A key example is the appointment of focal points
within national governments to coordinate policy de-
velopment on atrocity crime prevention and response.14
These national-level officials are critical in giving ef-
fect to RtoP’s first pillar, insofar as they accelerate the
adoption of domestic measures that will advance imple-
mentation of these obligations. Such steps include con-
ducting a national risk assessment; signing and ratify-
ing relevant treaties of international human rights law
and international humanitarian law, as well the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court; and devel-
oping laws and institutions to address exclusion and
discrimination.
A growing number of states have also developed, or
are in the process of developing, what the Auschwitz
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation refers to as “na-
tional mechanisms” for the prevention of genocide and
other atrocity crimes.These are officially established bod-
ies that coordinate collaboration among various govern-
ment departments and agencies, as well as civil society,
to improve state capacity to respond to atrocity crimes
– either within or beyond its borders – and are thus
an avenue through which national authorities can ex-
ercise their “responsibility to prevent” (AIPR 2017). In
addition to developing capacity for early warning, these
mechanisms include explicit training programs for civil
servants, policy recommendations for protecting vulnera-
ble populations, and communications strategies with rel-
evant regional and international organizations. Exam-
ples include the national committees for genocide and
atrocity crime prevention created by Kenya, Tanzania
and Paraguay, as well as the U.S. Atrocities Prevention
Board established by the former Obama Administra-
tion. Following the 2014 Report of the Secretary-General
on RtoP’s second pillar, national governments also have
14 Since 2010, 60 states – almost a third of the UN mem-
bership - have appointed national focal points. See the
updated complete list at http://www.globalr2p.org. (Ac-
cessed 15 October 2018)
clear guidance on the various ways in which they can
assist other states in fulfilling their protection responsi-
bilities, by helping to build key “inhibitors” to atrocity
crimes (Ban Ki-moon 2014: paras 43–58). In short, the
content of RtoP’s second pillar has become even more
action- guiding, and is now beginning to shape national
governments’ approach to development assistance and
diplomacy.
Progress in capacity building is also evident, though
to a lesser degree, at the regional and international levels.
Within the European Union, an RtoP focal point has been
appointed to coordinate the work of policy divisions ac-
tive in different aspects of atrocity crime prevention and
response. The EU has also revised its early warning tool,
originally designed for conflict prevention, to incorporate
indicators relevant to genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. Within the United Nations, implemen-
tation of RtoP has benefitted most visibly from the work
of the Joint Office for the Prevention of Genocide and
the Responsibility to Protect, and from the adoption of
a new Framework of Analysis that both specifies the risk
factors of atrocity crimes and sets out a process for iden-
tifying and elevating “situations of concern” (United Na-
tions 2014). In 2013, the Action Plan for the Secretary
General’s HumanRights Up Front initiative launched fur-
ther institutional reforms to strengthen the link between
early warning and early action in the UN system (United
Nations 2013).
However, it is more difficult to issue definitive judg-
ments about facticity with respect to RtoP’s third pil-
lar, given persistent questions about the degree to which
paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome Document is re-
ally “action-guiding”. As suggested above, the most that
can be said of this prescriptive element of the RtoP norm
is that states have a duty to identify when atrocity crimes
are being committed or are imminent, and to deliberate,
through applicatory discourses, on how different actors
(national, regional and international) can and should re-
spond, using diplomatic, political, humanitarian, and –
if necessary – military means. The norm itself does not
dictate what precise response should follow in any given
case. The 2015 report of the Secretary-General elaborates
how non-military tools – such as preventive diplomacy,
humanitarian action, and political negotiation – can be
part of the international community’s exercise of its re-
sponsibility to protect (Ban Ki-moon 2015a: paras. 37–
42), and points to successful cases where these “peaceful
means of Pillar III” (Bellamy 2016) have made a differ-
ence. Nonetheless, contestation lingers over two difficult
issues: the relationship between RtoP’s three pillars; and
when the responsibilities of the international community
under the third pillar are activated.
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The Three Pillars: Mutually Reinforcing or
Sequential?
The first form of contestation that has placed a “drag”
on RtoP’s facticity surrounds the relationship between
the norm’s component pillars. Importantly, the Summit
Outcome Document itself does not articulate the RtoP
norm in terms of pillars; rather, this framework was de-
vised and advocated by the Secretary-General’s first Spe-
cial Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, as expressed
in the 2009 report of the Secretary General. Nonetheless,
despite their absence from RtoP ‘version 1.0’, the three
pillars have become a key reference point for state dis-
course and implementation and there is a high degree of
consensus on their content.
Where some states continue to raise concerns, how-
ever, is in relation to sequencing. The original three pillar
framework set out in 2009 suggests that the pillars are of
equal weight, mutually reinforcing, and non-sequential.
In this formulation, the state’s primary responsibility to
protect does not evaporate when states request interna-
tional assistance to fulfill their protection responsibili-
ties, or when the international community provides emer-
gency protection capacity (Ban Ki-moon 2016b).General
Assembly discussions of RtoP nonetheless reveal that a
set of states believes that the responsibility to protect is
first and foremost a national responsibility, and that the
role of the international community is secondary: the lat-
ter comes into play only when national capacity is proven
to be insufficient.15 This view was also represented in the
negotiations over a new General Assembly Resolution in
2015,when certain states opposed the language of “equal
and mutually reinforcing pillars”. Moreover, some states
conflate the entire third pillar with the use of military
means, and thus frame the role of the international com-
munity – rather than the more specific exercise of mili-
tary force – as a matter of “last resort”. Although this
form of contestation appears to operate on an interpre-
tive level, and therefore does not constitute a threat to
the norm’s validity, the persistent debate over sequencing
could be seen as a proxy for a deeper belief that the pil-
lars of RtoP are hierarchical, with the first pillar having
the greatest validity.
More broadly, the degree to which RtoP enjoys high
levels of facticity has been affected by continuing contes-
tation over both the appropriateness and nature of the
15 This concern was voiced by a number of states at the
Thematic Event of the President of the General As-
sembly on the Responsibility to Protect, 26 February
2016. See especially the comments of Egypt, Venezuela,
and Cuba. A summary of all statements is available at
http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/897.
use of military means under the third pillar. On one read-
ing, the controversy that erupted after the 2011 Libyan
intervention can be seen as a continuation of applicatory
contestation: the debate was not about whether military
force to protect civilians is appropriate, but rather about
whether all political and diplomatic means had been ex-
hausted, and whether the use of force represented a ‘last
resort’. On this reasoning, the debate post Libya may
have been lively, but does not damage RtoP’s validity.
Indeed, the discussion has in some ways played a pro-
ductive role by bringing to the fore aspects of RtoP that
were always present, but which were underemphasized
in the decade after 2005 – namely, the need for focus on
rebuilding after protection. We might therefore conclude
that complex norms, such as RtoP, may in fact have extra
armor against the forms of contestation that are poten-
tially degrading, as disagreement over one element may
serve to strengthen other dimensions of the norm.
Nevertheless, contestation in the period after 2011
has injected a new element into the discourse surround-
ing RtoP that carries the potential to make collective ac-
tion through the UN Security Council less likely, and
thus to ‘hollow out’ a key part of the norm’s core. Al-
though the 2005 Summit Outcome Document indicates
that states support the use of the Security Council’s pow-
ers under the collective security provisions of the Char-
ter to respond to situations featuring atrocity crimes on a
case-by-case basis, the intervention in Libya raised ques-
tions about how those who use force on behalf of the
Council can and should be accountable. In other words,
while the language of paragraph 139 was meant to guard
against abuse of the principle of RtoP, the experience
of Libya has suggested to some states that further mea-
sures are needed. Since 2011, a new kind of political
coalition has thus formed which includes both pro-RtoP
states that opposed the stretching of the NATO man-
date given by Resolution 1973 in the particular case of
Libya, and developing countries that have always wor-
ried about the prospect of externally-imposed regime
change (Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourhino 2016). As
the negotiations over the draft General Assembly Res-
olution in 2015 reveal, this coalition is opposed by the
so-called P3 members of the Security Council (the United
States, France and the United Kingdom), who remain re-
sistant to anymechanisms that would dilute the Council’s
freedom of maneuver to respond to threats to interna-
tional peace and security, or submit the Council’s actions
or delegation to a form of oversight.
Uncertainty and Applicability
The second form of contestation that has affected RtoP’s
facticity has surfaced in particular country situations,
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and revolves around the question of whether the inter-
national community’s responsibility to assist or respond
has been activated. While the Summit Outcome Docu-
ment productively specified the scope of RtoP by reduc-
ing the more general threshold of “large scale loss of life”
- originally set out in the ICISS report - to the identifica-
tion of four specific crimes and violations, debate over
what situations feature atrocity crimes, or the imminent
risk of atrocity crimes, has continued. In short, greater
norm precision has not ended contestation over the ap-
plicability of elements of RtoP in real-world cases. This
contestation has been particularly pronounced in retro-
spective discussions concerning the Libyan case, as crit-
ics now claim that the capacity of Qaddafi to engage in
large-scale massacres was greatly overstated and that the
framing of the crisis through the lens of responsibility to
protect was misplaced (Kuperman 2013).
Contestation over framing was also evident in discus-
sions amongmembers of the Security Council in 2015–16
regarding the deepening political crisis in Burundi, which
resulted in widespread human rights violations and sys-
tematic killing.One group of states (including Permanent
Members France and the UK and non-permanent mem-
bers Chile, Nigeria and Lithuania) explicitly framed the
situation as one involving the growing risk of atrocity
crimes. The group supported a briefing to the Security
Council (on November 9, 2015) by the Special Adviser
on the Prevention of Genocide, and proposed robust lan-
guage for a Security Council resolution that would have
called on the Government of Burundi to fulfill its respon-
sibility to protect. But other Council members (particu-
larly Russia) were adamant that the situation was not one
relevant to RtoP, opposed any consideration of a Chapter
VII-authorized deployment of UN forces, and prevented
the inclusion of RtoP language in the resolution that was
eventually tabled to address the crisis on November 12,
2015.16 Russia (and China) also voted against a subse-
16 See Security Council Resolution 2248 (2015). The reso-
lution mentions more generally the responsibility of the
Government of Burundi “for ensuring security in its ter-
ritory and protecting its population with respect for the
rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian
law”. Its operative paragraphs, inter alia, urge the Bu-
rundian authorities to accept the regional mediation ef-
fort (endorsed by the African Union); and express the in-
tention of the Council “to consider additional measures
against all Burundian actors whose actions and state-
ments contribute to the perpetuation of violence.” Ear-
lier drafts contained more specific references to RtoP,
including the early warning role of the Special Advis-
ers on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to
quent UN Human Rights Council resolution that dis-
patched independent experts to Burundi to investigate
allegations of torture, summary executions, and forced
disappearance (United Nations Human Rights Council
2015b).
Syria offers another illustration of how perceptions of
the political utility of RtoP language have evolved. Given
the political deadlock within the UN Security Council
over the legitimacy of international efforts to address the
violence,most of the initial measures taken in response to
the intensifying violence in Syria were adopted indepen-
dently rather than collectively. For example, the United
States imposed sanctions, as did the Arab League and the
European Union. The first Resolution passed by the Se-
curity Council came only in February 2014 and was fo-
cused on a narrow objective: demanding that parties to
the conflict allow delivery of humanitarian assistance.17
The agreed upon language of this Resolution – alongwith
subsequent Council decisions18 – does invoke Pillar I by
reminding government authorities of their responsibility
to protect the Syrian population. But the broader inter-
national responsibilities associated with RtoP were not
articulated by the Council. Although some scholars have
tried to depict the Security Council’s resolutions on hu-
manitarian relief operations as a form of RtoP ‘in action’,
and an example of the pursuit of pragmatist ethics by
Western diplomats in the face of narrow room for ma-
neuver (Ralph 2018), this approach risks substantially
diluting what is meant by “protection”, especially in the
context of RtoP. The norm was designed not primarily to
facilitate the delivery of life-saving supplies, such as food
and medical assistance - for which there was already a
well-established legal framework - but rather to ensure
protection from widespread and systematic killing that
amounts to international criminal action.
Nor did the three pillars of RtoP play a particularly
prominent role in Western public discourse over Syria,
when measured in terms of elite media content. An exam-
ination of approximately two hundred and fifty articles
Protect. Author’s confidential interviews with represen-
tatives of civil society and diplomats from Permanent
Missions in New York, December 2015.
17 See Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014). Previ-
ous resolutions tabled earlier on in the crisis, propos-
ing more robust international action (such as Security
Council-authorized sanctions), were vetoed.
18 See Security Council Resolutions 2165 (2014), 2254
(2015), 2258 (2015), and 2332 (2016). The Human Rights
Council also passed fourteen resolutions between De-
cember 2011 and October 2016 that referenced the re-
sponsibilities of the Syrian authorities under Pillar I.
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or opinion pieces in leading English and French-language
newspapers that explicitly mentioned RtoP in the period
between June 2011 (when the crackdown on protests in
Syria began) and the siege of the city of Aleppo (in De-
cember 2016), reveals that a third of the references to
“responsibility to protect” occurred during the summer
of 2013, when Western countries were debating how to
respond to the chemical attacks that killed civilian popu-
lations in the suburbs of Damascus.19 Western leaders or
diplomats rarely used RtoP terminology in the first year
of crisis (from June 2011 to August 2012), despite com-
mentators noting that the number of Syrians killed and
the nature of the violence was as severe – if not worse –
than what had occurred in Libya prior to international
action. The lack of references to RtoP is also curious
given Commission of Inquiry reports that clearly deter-
mined that military commanders and government offi-
cials had committed “widespread, systematic rights vio-
lations that constituted crimes against humanity” (United
Nations Human Rights Council 2012). Instead, fall-out
from the earlier NATO intervention in Libya led many
Western actors to question the political utility of fram-
ing the situation in Syria in RtoP terms.20 Even Kofi An-
nan, who served as envoy to Syria for the UN and Arab
League in 2012, acknowledged that the manner in which
RtoP had been implemented in Libya had limited the po-
litical space for agreement on a collective response by the
major powers to the Syrian crisis. In an opinion piece in
Le Monde, Annan wrote that “Les Russes et les Chinois
considèrent qu’ils ont été dupés … Des que l’on discute
de la Syrie, c’est l‘éléphant dans la pièce.’” (Annan 2012)
(The Russians and the Chinese consider that they have
been duped … As soon as we discuss Syria, it [Libya] is
the “elephant in the room”.)
One of the few influential voices that did cite RtoP, the
French public intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy, mounted
a strong prudential argument against using Libya as
a precedent for Syria. While there was clearly a just
cause for intervention in the latter case, he argued, the
less favorable context for military action and the like-
lihood of negative consequences made the employment
of other diplomatic tools the more ‘responsible’ choice
19 This Factiva search included Le Monde, The Times, The
Financial Times, TheGuardian, TheNewYork Times, The
Washington Post, and The Globe and Mail.
20 Two French journalists, writing in 2012, noted that RtoP
had been only weakly invoked “a ce point inaudible, du
moins conteste, par d’importants pays du Sud (Brésil,
Inde, Afrique du Sud) que les diplomates occidentaux
… évitent d’y faire la moindre référence” (Ayad and
Nougayrede 2012).
(Levy 2012). There was also a lively debate initiated by
senior Republican Senators in the United States in the first
half 2012, which referenced the principle of RtoP and fo-
cused on alternatives to military intervention – most no-
tably the possibility of arming Syrian opposition groups
to enable them to self-protect against government spon-
sored violence (Krauthammer 2012). But such discus-
sions of alternative ways to implement the international
community’s responsibility to protect proved to be the
exception rather than the rule. After the brief debate that
occurred on the pages of Western newspapers in August
2012, over the possibility of creating safe zones in Syria,
explicit invocations of RtoP virtually disappeared.
The renewed spike in references to RtoP in the sum-
mer of 2013, while part of the rationale for urging robust
international action in response to the chemical attacks,
should be seen within a discursive context that was shift-
ing from a call to protect populations to an imperative
to punish a government that had allegedly used weapons
of mass destruction. The situation in Syria had already
amounted to a “manifest failure” on the part of national
authorities to protect populations well before the August
2013 incident involving chemical weapons. Yet, it was
only at this point in the crisis that the public discourse
– particularly in France – appealed to the international
community’s responsibility to protect, placing the conflict
alongside historical incidences of atrocity crimes, such as
in Kosovo in 1999.21 Although the discourses of protect-
ing and punishing were linked, they also evinced different
logics – the former about taking collective action to re-
spond to and prevent the commission of atrocity crimes
and the latter about the need to preserve the potency of
a normative taboo against the use of a banned weapon
(Carpenter 2013).
It was the second logic, which built upon President
Obama’s warning about crossing a ‘red line’, that domi-
nated the political discourse about Syria in the autumn
of 2013, and not the appeal to an international re-
sponsibility to protect. Indeed, the former president of
Médecins sans Frontières, Rony Braumann, described
President Hollande’s summoning of RtoP as disingenu-
ous and an “abus de langage” (abuse of language), given
that real protection for civilians was unlikely to be forth-
coming (Truong 2013). For his part, President Obama
studiously avoided invoking RtoP when making the case
for airstrikes, stressing instead the need to enforce the
worldwide ban on the use and production of chemical
21 Then French President Francois Holland explicitly in-
voked RtoP as part of the rationale for considering mil-
itary action in a speech on August 27, 2013 (Chatelot
2013).
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weapons. Commenting on the administration’s framing
of the case for military action, the U.S. Holocaust Mu-
seum’s Michael Abramowitz suggested that the President
and his advisors did not view RtoP as having the power
to mobilize public support for action. “Saving lives”, he
wrote, “is a hard sell these days” (Abramovitz 2013). In
the UK, those publicly making the argument for the use
of force proved more willing to speak about the “hu-
manitarian” imperative, including by claiming (contro-
versially) that military action without Security Council
authorization was legal (Rifkind 2013). Nevertheless, the
defeat of a government motion in the House of Com-
mons on August 29 that would have authorized military
action that was “legal, proportionate and focused on sav-
ing lives by preventing and deterring further use of Syria’s
chemical weapons” prompted public debate on whether
the country was retreating from its commitment to act
robustly to protect civilians in peril.22
Following the flurry of diplomatic efforts to remove
chemical weapons from Syria in 2013, the conflict set-
tled into a grinding stalemate in which civilians contin-
ued to be subject to deliberate attacks and, in the case
of cities like Madaya and Aleppo, siege and starvation.
Yet the role of the international community was framed
not in terms of the responsibility to protect, but in one of
two ways: offering support to UN-sponsored efforts to
negotiate a solution, or pressuring warring parties to en-
able the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is partic-
ularly notable that RtoP terminology appeared less than
30 times in key Western newspapers in 2015 and 2016,
despite mounting reports of war crimes and other atroc-
ity crimes from the Independent International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (United Na-
tions Human Rights Council 2015a and 2016a).
The Role of Terminology in Norm Contestation
The cases of Burundi and Syria thus bring into focus the
role of terminology in norm contestation. More specifi-
cally, they raise the question as to whether a norm’s ro-
bustness depends (partially) on its explicit invocation by
actors in real-world cases.Many advocates of RtoP insist
that the absence of specific language cannot be taken as
evidence of lack of commitment to the norm. Whether
states speak specifically in the terms of RtoP is less im-
portant than whether real practice supports prevention
22 In September 2013, a cross-party group of senior politi-
cians, including former government cabinet ministers,
wrote to the leaders of Britain’s three main political par-
ties urging them to not to see the defeated motion on
Syria as the end of country’s “responsibility to protect
civilians” (Wintour 2013).
of, or response to, atrocity crimes. Though there is some
merit to this assertion, the political nature and purpose
of the norm of RtoP arguably makes it more important
that it is explicitly invoked. If one of the norm’s purposes
is to identify situations of concern and mobilize action,
the absence of its framing language could be a sign that
applicatory contestation is having a knock-on effect on
the norm’s validity.
Some of the more critical scholars of RtoP have be-
gun to develop this point, by underscoring the fact that
while the Security Council has tabled a number of resolu-
tions containing language related to RtoP,23 the majority
of these have referenced the first pillar. Invocations of Pil-
lar III language, by contrast, are in short supply. This con-
trast suggests to them that there is a waning commitment
to asserting and acting upon the international commu-
nity’s responsibility to protect in the ‘hard’ cases, when
governments are unable or unwilling to protect their pop-
ulations (Hehir 2015). But there are two problems with
this line of argument. First, it tries to cherry pick particu-
lar elements from a complex norm by claiming that only
a robust response from the international community, to
a manifest failure to protect populations, represents the
‘real’ RtoP. And second, this judgment glosses over the
reality that there were very few cases in the period under
examination in which coercive action by international ac-
tors (without the consent of the state) was conceived as
possible or appropriate. It is thus premature to conclude,
from this argument at least, that RtoP’s very validity is at
stake.
The willingness of Western actors to forego RtoP lan-
guage in the Burundi case, and the circumscribed manner
in which it was deployed in the Syrian case, does seem to
demonstrate that actors are less convinced of the politi-
cal utility of the terminology – particularly in the years
after the controversial intervention in Libya and the con-
testation it engendered. But does this also mean that the
norm’s audiences are less persuaded by RtoP’s prescrip-
tions? This is the more pertinent question for judging
norm robustness.
The characterization of and response to the violence
in Burundi and Syria would amount to a weakening of
RtoP’s robustness only if it could be shown that the duty
of conduct prescribed by the norm failed to materialize
in these situations. Returning to the standard I set out
earlier, two questions would seem especially important.
First, did the majority of actors (both states and other key
international actors) view the violence as grave enough
23 See, in particular, Security Council Resolutions 1975
(2011), 1996 (2011), 2085 (2012), 2121 (2013), and 2150
(2014).
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to point to the risk or commission of atrocity crimes –
thus constituting a matter of international concern? And
second, did states at both the regional and international
level deliberate on various forms of response and utilize
national and international policy tools to address the sit-
uation?
The evidence from the Burundian case indicates that
the validity of the normative content of RtoP, includ-
ing the prescriptions related to the role of the interna-
tional community, remains strong. Members of the Secu-
rity Council who advocated for UN-sponsored action in
the autumn of 2015 maintain that the overall purpose of
Resolution 2248 (and subsequent Council decisions) was
to implement the responsibility to protect. The fact that
particular terminology did not appear in the final text
was a compromise to avoid a Russian abstention, which
might have diluted the message being sent to national au-
thorities in Bujumbura. A unanimous vote, in the words
of one diplomat, “created the appearance of a united in-
ternational community prepared to take further steps if
the violence escalated.”24 Although some might read the
Russian position on Burundi as a form of validity contes-
tation, given that its representatives tried to suggest that
violence that was ‘merely’ political was a matter for the
sovereign government of Burundi, Russia’s more general
engagement with RtoP suggests it is not fully rejecting the
norm but rather trying to shape its meaning – particularly
to emphasize prevention and national ownership, and to
act as “watch-dog” against any Western-driven abuse of
the principle (Kurowska 2014).
Furthermore, the broader actions of the international
community - which the Russian government itself helped
to sponsor - demonstrated a belief in the legitimacy of
using a variety of measures preventively to alter the be-
havior and dynamics inside the Burundian state that were
creating the potential for wide-spread atrocity crimes.
These steps included human rights monitors and military
experts dispatched by the African Union; a regional me-
diation effort supported by the Security Council; contin-
gency planning by the United Nations for an increased
field presence (which ultimately resulted in a Security-
Council authorized deployment of UN police units); a
Security Council mission to Burundi in January 2016;
and continued updates to the Council by the Secretary
General on both the political crisis and the human viola-
tions in the country, including “on any public incidents of
incitement to hatred and violence (emphasis added).”25
24 Author’s confidential interviews with diplomats at Per-
manent Missions in New York, December 2015.
25 Security Council Resolution 2303 (2016). It should be re-
called here that paragraph 138 of the 2005 Summit Out-
This kind and this level of Security Council engagement
in a situation that did not constitute a formal armed con-
flict reflects a significant evolution in expectations about
the role and responsibilities of the international commu-
nity. It is also in marked contrast to the approach taken
by the international community in the context of previ-
ous crises in Burundi (in the late 1980s and mid 1990s).
In these crises, international action was focused solely
on elite negotiations and power-sharing arrangements
(Lotze and Martins 2015).
The evidence in Syria might appear, at first glance, to
point overwhelming to norm weakening. It is undeniable
that RtoP language declined in usage, as perceptions of
its political utility changed; that collective action to pro-
tect populations was neither timely nor decisive; and that
the role of the Security Council was focused on human-
itarian assistance, rather than protection from atrocity
crimes. Nonetheless, belief in the normative content of
RtoP has also been evident in a variety of (sometimes un-
expected) ways. The majority of Council members have
viewed the crisis, from its earliest stages, as a situation
featuring international crimes, and as one requiring some
form of collective response. More importantly, the inter-
national community is much broader than the Security
Council. Throughout the civil war in Syria, the UN Hu-
man Rights Council has remained actively engaged, most
notably through its Commission of Inquiry, which has
documented and deplored the failure to uphold the re-
sponsibility to protect. In addition, in a non-binding res-
olution on August 2, 2012, the UNGeneral Assembly ex-
plicitly condemned the Council for its inability to uphold
its responsibility to address the mounting crisis. Follow-
ing the defeat of Western-sponsored efforts to refer the
situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court, the
Assembly in December 2016 took the unprecedented step
of passing a resolution to create what is now known as
the IIIM: the International, Impartial and Independent
Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecu-
tion of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes
under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab
Republic (United Nations General Assembly 2016). The
mandate of this new kind of accountability mechanism
– to collect and analyze evidence of atrocity crimes and
human rights violations in Syria with the aim of facili-
tating future international criminal proceedings – reflects
the view of the overwhelming majority of UN member
come Document not only notes the primary responsi-
bility of national authorities to protect populations from
atrocity crimes, but also indicates that this responsibil-
ity “entails prevention of such crimes, including their in-
citement.”
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states that the violence perpetrated over the course of this
long conflict is not subject solely to the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the Syrian state, but is a matter of deep interna-
tional concern.
Conclusion
This article has sought to transcend the conventional de-
bate over RtoP’s status and impact as a norm, by utilizing
the parameters of norm robustness provided by the edi-
tors of this Special Issue. It does so by clarifying RtoP’s
political nature, elaborating on the three sets of prescrip-
tions that make up this complex norm, and illustrating
how RtoP’s third pillar - which requires collective action
for its fulfillment - poses challenges for measuring norm
robustness. It then showed how applicatory contesta-
tion over the first decade of RtoP’s existence has brought
about a high degree of consensus on RtoP’s core elements,
thereby enhancing its validity. However, I also demon-
strated how some of RtoP’s initial cosmopolitan aspira-
tions became muted as its state-centric foundations were
emphasized. Furthermore, persistent applicatory concern
over RtoP’s third pillar - displayed most vividly in the re-
cent 2018 formal debate in the UN General Assembly -
has opened up deeper forms of contestation around its
content and potentially its validity. This latter form of
contestation has in some cases had a negative impact on
the willingness of actors to frame situations explicitly in
RtoP terms, arguably weakening the political utility of its
language.
Nevertheless, two factors work to buttress support
for the norm. First, RtoP is embedded in a deeper and
broader normative complex that includes genocide pre-
vention, particular principles of international humanitar-
ian law, accountability for international crimes, guaran-
tees of “non-recurrence”, and the protection of civilians
in armed conflict (Kurtz and Rotmann 2016). Given that
many of the obligations associated with this more general
framework have been strengthened and formalized in re-
cent decades, it is hard to foresee the “death” of RtoP.
This feature of embeddedness is illustrated by the most
recent report of the UN Secretary General on RtoP, in
2017, which explicitly links implementation of the RtoP
norm to a number of institutionalized procedures for
preventing and responding to violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law. This includes, for
example, the Universal Periodic Review process of the
Human Rights Council (Guterres 2017).
Second, substantial progress in implementation is al-
ready underway with respect to RtoP’s first pillar, where
state practice is conforming in a reasonably straightfor-
ward way to what scholars of international norms would
expect: national/domestic-level actors interpreting and
‘localizing’ an international norm within their particu-
lar context (Betts and Orchard 2014; Bellamy and Luck
2018). The key question for RtoP’s future robustness is
whether the contestation over the particular issue of the
use of military means can play a productive function, po-
tentially leading to amendments to the provisions for the
use of force, or whether it will erode the painstaking con-
sensus that has been built over the need to prevent and
respond to atrocity crimes.
More generally, the analysis in this article has shown
that all three features of RtoP - its political, directive and
aspirational nature - have implications for the framework
of norm robustness proposed by Zimmerman and Deit-
elhoff. In particular, the general conjectures advanced for
robustness - specifically those related to institutionaliza-
tion - may need to be adjusted or further specified, de-
pending on the type of norm under examination. First,
as an aspirational and political norm, RtoP has been par-
ticularly susceptible to the impact of particular cases of
action or inaction in the face of atrocity crimes. These
instances have given rise to intense periods of contesta-
tion that have shaped understandings of the norm’s ap-
plication and stretched to questions about the norm’s
deeper validity. Second, directive norms that do not spec-
ify a course of action present particular difficulties for
assessing a norm’s impact. As I have argued, RtoP’s com-
plex character, containing three sets of prescriptions, re-
quires different kinds of conduct by national, regional
and international actors. Consequently, any overall judg-
ment about the norm’s robustness requires an integrated
assessment of forms and levels of contestation. One of
the central findings of this article is that complex norms
can actually appear more robust, given that contestation
normally only challenges one of their dimensions (leav-
ing other prescriptive elements intact or even strength-
ened).
The final and more general point raised by the case
of RtoP relates to temporality. How should we judge the
dynamics of (relatively) new norms? A little more than
a decade after the World Summit, any evaluation of the
norm of the responsibility to protect needs to assess its ro-
bustness not just in terms of how close the international
community is to meeting its stated aspiration – a world
in which atrocity crimes are prevented or minimized –
but also in terms of the degree to which it has changed
expectations, which are largely framed in discourse. Fur-
thermore, that assessment should take place in relation to
other normative projects. The international human rights
regime, for example, while powerfully expressed in 1945,
took decades to mature and catalyze concrete changes
in state behavior (Moyn 2010). Indeed, aspects of the
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regime remain heavily contested (Hopgood, Snyder and
Vinjamuri 2017). Somemight therefore argue that it is far
too soon to definitively pronounce on RtoP’s robustness,
given that it is still in the early stages of what is likely to
be a long and “unsteady life”.26
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